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Consistent Earnings Growth and the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relation between a series of past earnings increases and the 
credibility of voluntary management earnings forecasts.  We demonstrate that both analyst 
forecast revisions and stock price reactions around management earnings forecasts that 
contain good news are more pronounced when the firm has posted a string of recent 
earnings increases.  These results are consistent with our primary hypothesis that voluntary 
management earnings forecasts are more believable when they are made by firms with a 
history of consistent growth in earnings.  This effect is more pronounced when firms are not 
widely followed by analysts.  Additional analysis suggests that management forecasts are 
more accurate relative to ex post realized earnings when made by a firm with consistent 
growth in prior earnings.  The effect of prior earnings growth on the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts is reduced when the level of net assets suggests a history of 
prior earnings management. 
 
 
JEL Classification: M41. 
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1. Introduction 
 This paper examines the relation between consistent earnings growth and the 
credibility of voluntary management earnings forecasts.  Specifically, using strings of 
increasing earnings as our measure of past performance, we demonstrate that earnings 
forecasts issued by firms with a recent string of increasing earnings are more credible than 
forecasts issued by firms without a recent string of increasing earnings.  Prior studies 
suggest that the information content of management forecasts is a function of their 
perceived accuracy (Jennings 1987 and King, et al. 1990).  We argue that managers of firms 
with long strings of increasing earnings generate more accurate forecasts of future 
profitability relative to managers of firms that have not experienced long strings of 
increasing earnings.  As a result market participants’ reactions to management earnings 
forecasts are more pronounced when preceded by a string of earnings increases. 
 The empirical observation that many managers focus on creating a series of 
increasing earnings changes (e.g., Burghstahler and Dichev 1997) has created a growing 
interest in the rewards to firms that exhibit this pattern.  For example, Barth, et al. (1999) 
find that firms which exhibit a pattern of increasing earnings are priced higher than those 
firms that do not exhibit such a pattern, even after controlling for growth opportunities and 
risk.  We document an additional benefit that is associated with such a pattern of earnings – 
voluntary disclosures made by management appear more credible.  The expectations 
adjustment hypothesis, as discussed by Ajinkya and Gift (1984) and King, et al. (1990), 
suggests that aligning market participants’ expectations with management’s private 
information is important to managers, but that providing detailed, quantitative voluntary 
disclosures is costly due to litigation concerns and proprietary costs.  Firms therefore 
voluntarily release as little information as possible in order to generate the revision in 
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expectations that they need.  One implication of the expectations adjustment hypothesis is 
that firms facing credibility problems need to supplement management earnings forecasts 
with the release of more detailed, potentially costly, information (Han and Wild 1991 and 
Hutton, et al. 2003).  If voluntary disclosures made by firms that exhibit long strings of 
increasing earnings are more credible, these firms may find it less costly to align market 
participants’ expectations with management’s private information. 
 In discussing management communication strategies, Palepu, Healy, and Bernard 
(2004, p. 13-8) note: 
 
When is management likely to face credibility problems with investors?  
There is very little evidence on this question.  However, managers of new 
firms, firms with volatile earnings, firms in financial distress, and firms 
with poor track records in communicating with investors should expect to 
find it difficult to be seen as credible reporters. 
Our study examines one facet of credibility – the role of volatile earnings.  A recent 
survey by Graham, et al. (2005) finds that 96.9% of surveyed CFOs prefer a smooth 
earnings path, citing the effect of smooth earnings on perceived risk, the cost of capital, 
credit ratings, and improving the ability of analysts and investors to predict the future.  
We argue that firms which post a long series of consecutive earnings increases are 
viewed by market participants are being more credible reporters – first because they may 
have superior forecasting ability and second because they have more to lose (in terms of 
reputation) from issuing a forecast that turns out to be, ex post, inaccurate.  A recent 
publication by Deloitte (2009) makes a similar point, noting “Some companies have such 
a strong track record of meeting or exceeding investor expectations that the market is 
willing to accept their story more or less on faith.” 
 To test this research question, we empirically examine the relation between firm’s 
prior performance and the credibility of management earnings forecasts using a sample of 
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8,335 quantitative annual management earnings forecasts collected by First Call 
Corporation.  Prior research on voluntary disclosure has used two proxies for the credibility 
of the management earnings forecasts:  market returns (e.g., Pownall and Waymire 1989, 
Pownall, et al. 1993, and Rogers and Stocken 2005) and analyst forecast revisions (e.g., 
Jennings 1987, and Williams 1996).  We use both proxies as measures of credibility.  
Supplemental analyses examine the ex post accuracy of management earnings forecasts 
relative to subsequently realized earnings. 
 Our results are consistent with our primary hypothesis that management earnings 
forecasts that contain good news are more credible for firms with long patterns of 
consecutively increasing earnings.  Capital market participants react more (both in terms of 
stock market reactions and analyst forecast revisions) to management forecasts made by 
firms with long strings of increasing earnings, in essence screening management forecasts 
based on the length of the series of past earnings increases.  This effect varies with analyst 
following, in that the past series of earnings increases affects credibility only when firms are 
not widely followed by analysts.  Supplemental analysis suggests that forecasts made by 
firms with long strings of prior earnings increases are also more accurate, where accuracy is 
measured by a comparison to ex post realized earnings.  We also show that the effect of 
prior earnings increases on the credibility of management earnings forecasts is reduced 
when the level of net assets suggests a history of prior earnings management. 
 This study makes two important contributions to the empirical accounting literature. 
First, to date, there is only limited empirical research identifying factors associated with 
management credibility.  This study examines one such factor, demonstrating an association 
between credibility of management earnings forecasts and the pattern of prior earnings.  
Second, this study extends Barth, et al. (1999) by identifying an additional market reward 
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associated with firms that show a pattern of increasing earnings.  Our results suggest firms 
that can continuously post increasing earnings may face fewer costs in aligning market 
expectations with management’s private information. 
 The next section develops our empirical predictions.  Section 3 discusses our 
research design and sample selection criteria.  Results are presented in section 4 and section 
5 concludes. 
2. Development of Empirical Predictions 
 Jennings (1987) argues that investors’ belief revision and subsequent reaction to 
management earnings forecasts depends on (1) the surprise or unexpected component and 
(2) the believability of the management forecast.  The believability of a forecast is in turn 
a function of management’s ability to forecast accurately and management’s incentives to 
issue forecasts that are free from intentional bias.  Most prior empirical work on 
voluntary management earnings forecasts has focused on the extent to which such 
forecasts are free of intentional bias (e.g., McNichols 1989, Frankel, et al. 1995, and 
Rogers and Stocken 2005) rather than focusing on the effects of firm performance.
1
  In 
this study we focus on the relation between the credibility of management earnings 
forecasts for firms with long strings of increasing earnings because we argue that 
managers of firms that have consistently performed well may have superior ability in 
                                                 
1
 One exception is Baik, et al. (2010) who examine the relation between CEO ability and the frequency, 
accuracy, and signaling effects of management earnings forecasts.  Our study differs from Baik, et al. (2010) 
in that we focus on the pattern of prior earnings, a firm-level characteristic, rather than the proxies for the 
talent of an individual CEO.  Baik, et al. (2010) focus on the signaling effects of forecasting, as posited by 
Trueman (1986), while we focus on cross-sectional variation in the credibility of forecasts.  We also differ 
from Baik, et al. (2010) in that we demonstrate how the importance of the pattern of past earnings as a 
signal of credibility varies with the sign of the earnings news, the level of information asymmetry 
surrounding the firm, and the extent to which the balance sheet suggests a history of prior earnings 
management.  Two other related papers are Williams (1996) and Hutton and Stocken (2009), who show 
that credibility of a forecast depends on the accuracy of prior forecasts. 
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predicting future earnings.  This is consistent with intuition given by Demski (1998) in 
which managers exerting high levels of effort are better in both running the firm and in 
forecasting future earnings.  By smoothing earnings, managers in Demski’s (1998) model 
both demonstrate their ability to predict future performance and reveal their high effort.  
Xue (2003) also suggests a link between management’s earnings smoothing behavior and 
management’s private information about future firm performance. 
 Prior research on bias in forecasting suggests that managers issuing voluntary 
disclosures take into account both the potential benefits and the potential costs associated 
with issuing an intentionally biased forecast.  Potential benefits come from employment 
concerns and equity-contingent wealth.  Potential costs arise from loss of reputation and 
legal concerns.  On average these costs are sufficient to deter biased forecasting (McNichols 
1989), although particular firms may choose to intentionally bias upwards or downwards 
based on individual circumstances.  Penalties from issuing inaccurate forecasts provide an 
additional motivation for predicting a link between past earnings growth and the credibility 
of management earnings forecasts.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms which 
experience long strings of earnings growth attract attention in the business press and a wider 
analyst following.  Firms that have experienced a long string of earnings growth have 
developed a good reputation among capital market participants, and so are particularly 
concerned about the loss of reputation that would accompany the revelation that a 
previously released forecast was inaccurate or biased. 
 Prior research suggests that market participants view the credibility of management 
forecasts differently based on the sign of the earnings news (e.g., Jennings 1987).  
Specifically, prior research finds that bad news forecasts are typically taken as credible, 
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while the credibility of good news forecasts varies with other available information.
2
  For 
example, Hutton, et al. (2003) examine the effect of including verifiable forward looking 
information with a management earnings forecast, and find that including such information 
has no effect on the credibility of bad news forecasts.  In contrast, good news forecasts are 
only believed when they are accompanied by verifiable forward looking information.  
Similarly, Williams (1996) finds that analysts condition their reaction to good news 
forecasts on the accuracy of prior forecasts more heavily than they condition their reaction 
to bad news forecasts on the accuracy of prior forecasts.  Koch (2006) finds that good news 
forecasts from financially distressed firms are discounted by analysts, while bad news 
forecasts are believed.  Rogers and Stocken (2005) also find that bad news is viewed as 
credible, while the market uses other information to filter out predictable bias in good news 
forecasts.  Consistent with these prior findings, we expect that the extent to which the 
credibility of management forecasts varies with the pattern of past earnings is more 
pronounced in good news forecasts.  In other word, bad news forecasts are assumed by 
investors to be credible, and so the credibility of bad news forecasts is not expected to 
depend on past earnings performance. 
 Some prior empirical research (e.g., Williams 1996) has used analyst forecast 
revisions as a proxy for the credibility of management earnings forecasts.  The motivation 
                                                 
2
 One exception is Kross, et al. (2010), who find that bad news quarterly forecasts are less credible when 
made by firms that have consistently met or beaten quarterly analyst expectations.  They find that firms 
with a track record of consistently beating analysts’ expectations are more likely to guide analysts 
downward to avoid breaking this consistent record.  Analysts begin to react less to this downward guidance, 
as they learn that managers are consistently guiding them down in order to beat expectations.  Our study 
differs from Kross, et al. (2010) in that we focus on past earnings growth, rather than past ability to meet or 
beat expectations.  We also focus on annual forecasts, which have different properties and objectives than 
quarterly forecasts.  Kross, et al.’s (2010) focus on opportunistic guidance to beat quarterly expectations is 
quite different from our setting, which leads to a different set of predictions.  Prior research suggests that 
annual forecasts contain a higher proportion of good news relative to quarterly forecasts and we expect 
annual forecasts to be less related to guiding expectations to meet or beat analyst predictions (which prior 
research, anecdotal evidence, and the business press suggests to be primarily a phenomenon related to 
quarterly earnings forecasts). 
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for this proxy comes from Jennings (1987), who argues that analyst forecasts reflect the 
beliefs of the investing community and analyst forecast revisions around management 
earnings forecasts therefore contain information about the extent to which that forecast is 
viewed as credible.  The disadvantage of using analyst forecast revisions in empirical 
research is that sell-side analysts are known to suffer from a number of biases related to 
their individual processing abilities and the incentive structure in which they operate.
3
  One 
particular concern for our study is that analyst compensation is tied to forecast accuracy.  If 
firms are able to exert discretion over reported earnings, analysts may take this flexibility 
into account in generating their prediction of future earnings.  The results of Kasznik (1999) 
suggest that firms which issue overly optimistic management forecasts may later manipulate 
earnings upward in order to meet that forecast.  If analysts anticipate this behavior, then a 
management earnings forecast issued by a firm that can easily manipulate accruals could be 
“credible” in the sense that it generates a large revision in analyst forecasts even though that 
analyst reaction is driven by the anticipation of earnings management rather than by any 
substantive revision in expected future performance. 
 The possibility that mangers can manipulate accruals to hit their own forecasts and 
that analysts could simply revise their own forecasts in anticipation of such manipulation is 
particularly important to our study because of our focus on firms that have a history of 
smooth earnings.  We argue that sustained earnings increases proxies for superior 
forecasting ability.  If it instead proxies for the ability and or willingness to manipulate 
accruals then this would affect the interpretations of our results.
4
  Due to these concerns, we 
use share price reactions as an additional proxy for credibility.  This proxy has been used to 
                                                 
3
 For a summary of these biases see Francis (1997). 
4
 The extent to which the effect of prior earnings growth on the credibility of management earnings 
forecasts is influenced by concerns about past earnings management is directly examined in section 4.4. 
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measure the credibility of forecasts in the prior literature as well (e.g., Pownall and 
Waymire 1989).  Assuming that stock price equals the discounted value of expected future 
dividends, stock market reactions in response to a management earnings forecast are driven 
by revisions in expected future dividends.  Therefore, in contrast to analyst forecasts, it 
seems unlikely that share prices would move in the direction of anticipated earnings 
manipulation.  If the news component of a management earnings forecast is driven by the 
anticipation of earnings manipulation rather than any substantive revision in expected future 
performance then we would expect to find analysts revising their expectations without 
observing corresponding stock price reactions. 
 The use of both stock price reactions and analyst forecast revisions to assess the 
credibility of management earnings forecasts leads to the following two predictions: 
 
H1: Stock price reactions in response to good news forecasts are more pronounced for 
firms that exhibit a string of past earnings increases than for firms that do not exhibit 
a string of past earnings increases. 
 
H2: Analyst forecast revisions in response to good news forecasts are more pronounced 
for firms that exhibit a string of past earnings increases than for firms that do not 
exhibit a string of past earnings increases. 
3. Sample Selection and Design of Empirical Tests 
3.1 Sample selection and description 
Our sample includes firms with voluntary management forecasts of annual 
earnings in the First Call Historical Database for the years 1993 to 2004.  We restrict our 
attention to annual forecasts that are either point estimates or range estimates.
5
  As in the 
majority of studies on quantitative management earnings forecasts, we convert a range 
forecast into a point estimate by taking the midpoint of the range.  Forecasts issued on or 
after the fiscal year-end were eliminated to focus on management forecasts rather than 
                                                 
5
 We exclude minimum forecasts (“EPS will be at least…”) and maximum forecasts (“EPS will be less 
than…”).  We also exclude qualitative forecasts that do not explicitly state a per share amount (such as 
“EPS will be consistent with expectations”). 
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preannouncements of actual earnings.
6
  To control for possible sources of management 
bias, forecasts issued during mergers, bankruptcies, and stock offerings are not included.
7
  
To mitigate the small denominator problem associated with using price as a deflator, we 
also exclude firms with pre-release share prices under $2.00.  Firms in regulated 
industries such as utilities, transportation firms, and financial services are also eliminated.  
We also require CRSP and COMPUSTAT data on earnings, daily returns, and the 
variables necessary to calculate Altman’s [1968] Z-score.  These sample selection 
procedures result in a final sample of 8,335 management earnings forecasts.  These 
include multiple observations for some firms, so we follow Peterson (2009) and Gow, et 
al. (2010) by reporting all regression results using robust t-statistics that control for firm 
clustering effects.  All reported p-values are two-tailed.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of management earnings forecasts for our 
sample. Approximately 50% of sample firms issue less than four management forecasts 
during the entire sample period. This is consistent with prior research documenting that 
few companies issue management forecasts regularly.  Table 1, Panel B shows the 
number of management earnings forecasts issued per year over our sample period.  There 
are fewer observations in the earlier years because First Call was just beginning to 
compile their historical database.  Consistent with prior literature, management forecasts 
appear to increase dramatically after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(e.g., Anilowski, et al. 2007).  Table 1, Panel C shows that the number of firms declines 
monotonically as the series of earnings increases becomes longer.  Table 1, Panel C also 
shows that good news forecasts are more frequent than the bad news forecasts.  This is 
                                                 
6
 Such preannouncements differ from management earnings forecasts in that while management is still 
giving a prediction (that may in fact differ from actual realized earnings), preannouncements are made after 
the end of the fiscal year and so do not require the forecasting of actual economic activity. 
7
 We use SDC and CRSP to identify such corporate events. 
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consistent with prior research that has found that annual forecasts are more likely to be 
long-horizon, good new forecasts; in contrast to quarterly forecasts which are often used 
as short-horizon warnings to preempt forthcoming bad earnings news. 
3.2  Research design 
3.2.1  Measures of credibility of management earnings forecasts 
 Our two main variables to measure the information content of management 
earnings forecasts are cumulative abnormal returns (CARit) and analyst forecast revisions 
(AFRit).  We measure CARit using 3-day market model adjusted stock returns during the 
window encompassed by event days (−1, +1), where event day 0 is the management 
earnings forecast date.  We use the CRSP equal-weighted return as the market return and 
estimate the market model parameters over the 200-day period from event day –210 to 
event day –11.8  
When calculating analyst forecast consensus, revisions in analyst forecasts, and 
the news in management earnings forecasts we use analysts forecasts of annual earnings 
related to the same fiscal year for which management is issuing a forecast.  Consensus 
analyst forecasts prior to management earnings forecasts for a given firm are calculated 
as the mean analyst forecast for all analysts reporting a forecast for that firm.
9
  Consensus 
analyst forecasts subsequent to management’s earnings forecast are calculated as the 
mean analyst forecast after the management earnings forecast for only those analysts 
included in the group composing the prior consensus forecast.  Analyst forecast revision 
(AFRit) is defined as the change between the consensus forecast prior to the management 
                                                 
8
 Using alternative event windows of (-1,0) or (-2,2) or using value-weighted market returns does not 
qualitatively affect our results.  Our results are also robust to using size-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns. 
9
 Using the median forecast to calculate the consensus forecast does not qualitatively affect our results.  
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earnings forecast and the consensus forecast following the management earnings forecast 
and is calculated as follows: 
 
it it
it
i
SFAF PFAF
AFR
P

  
where:  
  
 
itSFAF  = consensus analyst forecast subsequent to management’s earnings 
forecast, 
 
 itPFAF  = consensus analyst forecast prior to management’s earnings forecast, 
and 
 
 
itP  = share price of the firm on the first day of the fiscal year in which 
the management earnings forecast is made.
10
 
3.2.2  Measures of sustained earnings increases 
 We calculate the length of the string of prior earnings increases (STRNit) as the 
number of consecutive increases in annual earnings (before extraordinary items) that 
precede the management earnings forecast.
11
  As a link to prior research (in particular Barth, 
et al. 1999) we also divide firms into two groups – those with long strings of prior earnings 
increases versus those without.  We use five years as the cut-off point to identify firms with 
long strings (the same cut-off as Barth, et al. 1999).  STRN_Dit is the dichotomous variable 
taking the value of one if the number of years of increasing earnings prior to the 
management forecast is five or more and taking the value of zero otherwise.  Tests of H1 
and H2 are conducted using both STRNit and STRN_Dit. 
                                                 
10
 Forecast revisions and forecast deviations are deflated by a preannouncement price in order to control for 
size effects in cross-sectional comparisons. 
11
 We use COMPUSTAT, rather than First Call, as the source for earnings data in calculating the string of 
past earnings increases because First Call actual earnings estimates are incomplete prior to 1994. 
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3.2.3  Measures of forecast news 
Based on prior research, we selected several independent variables that potentially 
influence the market and analyst reactions to the management earnings forecasts.  First, we 
control for the forecast deviation (FDit) that measures the surprise component of the 
management earnings forecast and is calculated as the difference between the management 
forecast and the prior consensus analyst forecast (deflated by the share price of the firm on 
the first day of the fiscal year in which the management earning forecast is made): 
 
it it
it
i
MEF PFAF
FD
P

  
where: 
 
 itMEF  = management’s EPS forecast for firm i, 
 
 itPFAF  =  mean consensus analyst forecast prior to management’s earnings 
forecast, and 
 
 
itP  =  share price of the firm on the first day of the fiscal year in which 
the management earnings forecast is made. 
 Forecast deviations (FDit) greater than or equal to zero represent “good news” 
(GOODit), while forecast deviations less than zero represent “bad news” (BADit).
12
   
3.2.4  Regression specifications 
 To test our hypotheses, we use multiple regression models modified from 
Williams (1996).  Following Jennings’ (1987) arguments that investors’ belief revision and 
reaction to management earnings forecasts depend on the unexpected component as well as 
the believability of the management forecast, we construct a model in which both security 
                                                 
12
 Following Ajinkya, et al. (2005) we treat confirming forecasts as good news forecasts.  Clement, et al. 
(2003) document that significantly positive stock price reactions follow confirming management earnings 
forecasts.  We conduct robustness tests on a sample without confirming forecasts, and our results are not 
affected by this treatment. 
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price movements and analyst forecast revisions are functions of the surprise component and 
the string of past earnings increases.  Our focus is not on the length of prior earnings growth 
as an independent factor; rather our hypotheses relate to the interaction between prior 
earnings grown and the surprise component in management’s forecast.  That is, market 
participants are not reacting to the prior earnings growth alone, but instead are conditioning 
their reaction to the news in management’s forecast on the prior earnings growth.  The 
following pooled cross-sectional regression equations are used to test H1 and H2: 
 
 
Model [1a]: CARit = β0a +β1aSTRNit 
+β2aFDit +β3aFDit×STRNit×GOODit  
                              +β4aFDit×STRNit×BADit +β5aSIZEit +β6aFDit×SIZEit +β7aHORIZONit  
                              +β8aFDit×HORIZONit + β9aPOINTit + β10aFDit×POINTit + β11aMBit  
                              +β12aFDit×MBit +β13aFCFit+ β14aFDit×FCFit +β15aROAit  
                              +β16aFDit×ROAit+β17aDISTRESSit +β18aFDit×DISTRESSit + it  
 
Model [1b]: CARit =β0b +β1bSTRN_Dit 
+β2bFDit +β3bFDit×STRN_Dit×GOODit  
                               +β4bFDit×STRN_Dit×BADit + β5bSIZEit + β6bFDit×SIZEit  
                               +β7bHORIZONit + β8bFDit×HORIZONit + β9bPOINTit  
                               +β10bFDit×POINTit + β11bMBit +β12bFDit×MBit + β13bFCFit 
                                              +β14bFDit×FCFit +β15bROAit +β16bFDit×ROAit + β17bDISTRESSit  
                               +β18bFDit×DISTRESSit + it  
 
Model [2a]: AFRit = γ0a +γ1aSTRNit 
+γ2aFDit +γ3aFDit×STRNit×GOODit  
                              +γ4aFDit×STRNit×BADit +γ5aSIZEit +γ6aFDit×SIZEit +γ7aHORIZONit  
                              +γ8aFDit×HORIZONit +γ9aPOINTit +γ10aFDit×POINTit +γ11aMBit  
                              +γ12aFDit×MBit +γ13aFCFit+ γ14aFDit×FCFit +γ15aROAit  
                              +γ16aFDit×ROAit+γ17aDISTRESSit +γ18aFDit×DISTRESSit + it  
 
Model [2b]: AFRit =γ0b +γ1bSTRN_Dit 
+γ2bFDit +γ3bFDit×STRN_Dit×GOODit  
                               +γ4bFDit×STRN_Dit×BADit +γ5bSIZEit +γ6bFDit×SIZEit  
                               +γ7bHORIZONit + γ8bFDit×HORIZONit +γ9bPOINTit  
                               +γ10bFDit×POINTit +γ11bMBit +γ12bFDit×MBit +γ13bFCFit 
                                              +γ14bFDit×FCFit +γ15bROAit +γ16bFDit×ROAit +γ17bDISTRESSit  
                               +γ18bFDit×DISTRESSit + it  
where: 
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 AFRit = consensus analyst forecast subsequent to management’s earnings 
forecast less consensus analyst forecast prior to management’s 
earnings forecast, deflated by prior period price, 
 
 CARit = cumulative abnormal returns for the three-day period beginning a day 
before the management forecast and ending a day after the 
management forecast, 
 
 FDit  = management forecast less the prior consensus analyst forecast, 
deflated by beginning of year price, 
 
 STRNit = number of years of increasing EPS before the management forecast,  
 
 STRN_Dit = qualitative variable taking the value of one if years of increasing EPS 
before the management forecast is five or more and taking zero 
otherwise,  
  
 GOODit = qualitative variable taking the value of one if management’s earnings 
forecast is greater than or equal to the mean consensus analyst 
forecast prior to management’s earnings forecast, and zero otherwise, 
 
 BADit = qualitative variable taking the value of one if management’s earnings 
forecast is less than the mean consensus analyst forecast prior to 
management’s earnings forecast, and zero otherwise, 
 
 HORIZONit = natural logarithm of number of days between management forecast 
and fiscal period end date, 
 
 POINTit = management forecast precision, defined as zero (one) if 
management’s forecast is a range (point) forecast, 
 
 SIZEit = natural logarithm of market capitalization of the firm on the first day 
of the fiscal year in which the management earnings forecast is made, 
 
 FCFit = free cash flow, computed as (data13-data15-data16-data128)/data6 
from Compustat, 
 
 MBit = market-to-book value computed as (data199*data25/(data6-data181)) 
from Compustat, 
 
 ROAit = return on asset computed as data18/data6 from Compustat, and 
 
 DISTRESSit = financial distress measure which is zero if Altman’s Z-score > 2.6, 
one if 1.1 < Z-score ≤ 2.6, and two if Z-score ≤ 1.1. 
 
The coefficient β2 captures extent to which a unit of earnings news generates a price 
reaction and γ2 captures extent to which a unit of earnings news generates a revision in the 
15 
 
analysts’ consensus forecasts, respectively.  A great deal of prior research (beginning with 
Patel 1976 and Penman 1980) suggests that management earnings forecasts are, on average, 
credible and should generate both price reactions and analyst forecast revisions.  Therefore, 
we predict that both β2 and γ2 should be positive in all regression equations. 
To measure cross-sectional variation in the credibility of management forecasts, we 
interact STRNit (or STRN_Dit) with FDit.  Further, to test for an asymmetric response 
between good and bad news forecasts, we disaggregate FDit×STRNit into two three-way 
interaction terms (FDit×STRNit×GOODit and FDit×STRNit×BADit).  The coefficient β3 (γ3) 
reflects the incremental price reaction (analyst revision) in response to good news forecasts 
that are associated with firms that have a history of prior earnings increases.  A positive 
coefficient on β3 (γ3) in a model with STRNit would suggest that price reactions (analysts’ 
responses) to the good news in a management earnings forecast become more pronounced 
with the number of preceding consecutive years of earnings increases.  Similarly, a positive 
coefficient on β3 (γ3) in a model with STRN_Dit would suggest that price reactions (analyst 
responses) to the news in a management earnings forecast become more pronounced when 
the firm has experience a long (greater than or equal to five years) string of prior earnings 
increases. Our main hypothesis suggests that the relation between the credibility of forecasts 
and prior earnings news varies with the sign of the news (good news versus bad news). This 
asymmetric response suggests β3 > 0 (γ3 > 0), but suggests that β4 (γ4) should not differ 
significantly from zero.  The use of qualitative variables such as GOODit and BADit to 
separately estimate credibility effects for good and bad news management forecasts is 
consistent with the model used by Rogers and Stocken (2005). 
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We control for firm size (SIZEit), defined as the log of the market value of common 
equity at the beginning of the fiscal period.  The coefficient of FDit×SIZEit is expected to be 
negative, consistent with a negative relation between stock market reactions to earnings 
news and firm size because alternative information sources reduce and preempt the 
usefulness of earnings reports for these firms (Atiase 1985; Baginski and Hassell 1997).  
The coefficient of FDit× HORIZONit is expected to be negative because long horizon 
forecasts might be more optimistically biased and thus generate less market and analyst 
reactions (Johnson, et al. 2001).  We control for forecast specificity using POINTit which 
takes a value of one for point forecasts and zero for range forecast.  Pownall, et al. (1993) 
and Baginski, et al. (1993) document that price reactions to management forecasts are 
increasing in forecast specificity, which suggests a positive coefficient for FDit× POINTit.  
We expect firms with high growth opportunities to attract more attention from the capital 
market and thus forecasts from these firms subjected to greater scrutiny.  We therefore 
expect a positive coefficient on FDit×MBit.  Prior research suggests that cash-rich firms are 
inclined to make investment projects that do not increase owners’ wealth (Harford 1999; 
Bates 2005).  These studies argue that agency problems are positively related to the firm’s 
free cash flow (FCFit).  We therefore expect a negative coefficient on FDit×FCFit.  We 
control for the effect of financial distress by calculating Altman’s [1968] Z-Score, which 
prior research has found to be negatively related to incidence of future bankruptcy over 
short horizons.  We calculate DISTRESSit as zero if Altman’s Z-score > 2.6, one if 1.1 < Z-
score ≤ 2.6, and two if Z-score ≤ 1.1.  Prior research (e.g., Koch 2006; Rogers and Stocken 
2005) finds that management forecasts are less credible when made by firms in financial 
distress, suggesting a negative coefficient on FDit×DISTRESSit.  Finally, patterns of 
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increasing prior earnings might be associated with profitability, and we control for 
contemporaneous profitability by including return on assets (ROAit). 
4. Results 
4.1. Correlation analysis and regression results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of treatment variables, conditioned on the 
pattern of prior earnings.  Firms with a long string of prior earnings increases tend to 
have larger cumulative abnormal returns in response to management forecasts, have 
smaller absolute forecast errors, are smaller in size, have smaller market-to-book values, 
have more free cash flows, and are more profitable relative to firms with short strings of 
prior earnings increases.  Means and medians for AFR and CAR reported in Table 2 
appear small because this pooled sample includes both good and bad news forecasts. 
Pearson correlation coefficients for our sample are presented in Table 3.  These 
show mixed evidence in support of our hypotheses, although that is not surprising as our 
hypotheses relate primarily to good news forecasts, and Table 3 presents data pooled 
across both good and bad news.  The correlations among our dependent and independent 
variables support the use of multiple regression analysis to examine the effect of past 
earnings patterns on the credibility of management earnings forecasts.   
Table 4 presents regression results from estimating equations [1a], [1b], [2a], and 
[2b].  For all regression results we remove significant outliers determined by absolute 
values of Cook’s distance greater than one (Cook 1977).  We present regression results for 
restricted models without control variables first in Table 4, Panel A.  Regression results of 
the models with various control variables are reported in Table 4, Panel B.   
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Consistent with the findings of prior research, coefficients for FDit are positive and 
significant in all specifications, suggesting that the news in management earnings forecasts 
is, on average, credible in the sense that it generates both analyst forecast revisions and 
abnormal price movements in the same direction as the news.   
 Model [1a] examines the effect of prior earnings increases on price responses to 
management earnings forecasts.  In this specification the coefficients β3a and β4a capture the 
incremental revision in share prices associated with each year of consecutive prior earnings 
increases to good and bad news forecasts, respectively.  β3a is positive and significant in 
both the restricted model presented in Table 4, Panel A (β3a = 0.895, p < 0.01) and the 
unrestricted model presented in Table 4, Panel B (β3a = 0.781, p < 0.01).  These results 
suggest that price responses to good news in management earnings forecasts are increasing 
in the number of consecutive prior earnings increases, consistent with H1. However, β4a is 
insignificant in both Table 4, Panel A (β4a = 0.017, p < 0.47) and Table 4, Panel B (β4a = 
0.022, p < 0.39), suggesting that the stock price responses to bad news forecasts are not 
affected by recent earnings history.  The insignificant coefficients for β4a are consistent with 
our expectations that the extent to which the credibility of management forecasts varies with 
the pattern of past earnings is more pronounced in good news forecasts.  As discussed 
earlier, bad news forecasts are assumed by investors to be credible, and so the credibility of 
bad news forecasts is not expected to vary with past earnings performance. 
Model [1b] examines the effect of a long series of earnings increases on price 
responses to management earnings forecasts.  The coefficient β3b captures the incremental 
market reaction to good news associated with the qualitative variable STRN_Dit.  β3b is 
again significant in both the restricted (β3b = 7.384, p < 0.01) and full specification (β3b = 
7.310, p < 0.01).  These results suggest that price responses to the news in management 
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earnings forecasts is more pronounced when it is preceded by a long string of consecutive 
earnings increases, consistent with H1.  The coefficient β4b, which captures the incremental 
market reaction to bad news associated with the qualitative variable STRN_Dit is 
insignificant in both the restricted (β4b = -0.047, p > 0.5) and full specification (β4b = 0.023, 
p > 0.5).  The lack of significance for bad news forecasts is again consistent with our 
expectations that bad news is always credible, and so credibility does not vary with 
additional factors such as past earnings performance. 
 Model [2a] examines the effect of past earnings increases on analyst forecast 
revisions in response to management earnings forecasts.  Overall, the regression results of 
both models are consistent with H2.  The coefficients of FDit×STRNit×GOODit  are 
significantly positive in both the restricted (γ3a = 0.170, p < 0.01) and full model (γ3a = 
0.123, p < 0.01).  The coefficient on FDit×STRNit×BADit is significantly positive in the 
restricted model (γ4a = 0.019, p < 0.01), although this relation becomes insignificant in the 
full model once additional controls are added (γ4a = -0.001, p > 0.5).  These results suggest 
that analysts’ reactions to good news in management earnings forecasts are increasing in the 
number of consecutive prior earnings increases, consistent with H2. 
 Model [2b] examines the effect of a long series of earnings increases on analyst 
forecast revisions in response to management earnings forecasts.  The coefficient γ3b 
captures the incremental revision in analysts’ forecasts to good news forecasts associated 
with the qualitative variable STRN_Dit.  Again γ3b is significantly positive in both the 
restricted (γ3b = 2.051, p < 0.01) and unrestricted model (γ3b = 1.997, p < 0.01), which 
suggests that analysts tend to believe good news in management earnings forecasts more 
when a management forecast is preceded by a long string of consecutive earnings increases.  
In contrast, the coefficient γ4b, which captures the incremental revision in analysts’ forecasts 
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in response to bad news forecasts associated with the qualitative variable STRN_Dit, is 
negative in both the restricted (γ4b = -0.086, p < 0.10) and unrestricted (γ4b = -0.155, 
p < 0.01) model.  This suggests that analysts tend to believe bad news in management 
earnings forecasts less when a management forecast is preceded by a long string of 
consecutive earnings increases.  While this differs from the results using market reactions, 
one explanation is that analysts are concerned that they are being guided downward (e.g., 
Kross, et al. 2010) simply so that mangers can exceed expectations at earnings 
announcements and that analysts discount such bad news accordingly. 
In most specifications, the estimated coefficients of the control variables generally 
coincide with our predictions.
13
  In summary, results from regressions [1a] through [2b] are 
consistent with our hypotheses that market participants react more strongly to quantitative 
management earnings forecasts when such forecasts are preceded by a series of earnings 
increases.  This result holds only for the subset of forecasts that contain good news, which is 
consistent with prior research that has found that bad news is inherently credible, while 
market participants condition reactions to good news based on other available information.  
Our results hold using either the number of preceding earnings increases as an explanatory 
variable or when using an indicator variable to denote firms with long strings of increasing 
prior earnings.  These results also hold after controlling for various factors that might 
potentially affect the credibility of management earnings forecasts. 
4.2. Effect of information asymmetry 
 In the preceding section we document that market responses to voluntary 
management earnings forecasts that contain good news are conditioned on the length of 
                                                 
13
 We do not find a support for the link between credibility and financial distress that has been documented 
in prior research. There are at least two possible explanations for these mixed results. First, prior research 
by Begley, Ming, and Watts (1997) suggests that the usefulness of Altman's Z-score may be declining in 
recent years.  In addition, Koch (2006) finds that the relation between financial distress and credibility 
varies with the sign of the earnings news. 
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consecutive prior earnings growth.  Our results are consistent with our prediction that 
consistent prior earnings growth is interpreted as a signal about the credibility of voluntary 
disclosures.  In this section we examine whether the importance of this signal varies with 
information asymmetry.   
Information asymmetry about a firm is high when managers have a relatively large 
amount of value-relevant, firm-specific information that is not shared by the market. 
Investors bear some firm-specific uncertainty until this information is revealed to the market. 
Firms have lower information asymmetry when they are more closely followed by analysts 
and the business press, and as a result market participants have more sources of information 
to draw on in assessing the abilities of management for these firms.  Therefore, the 
importance of this particular signal about management’s forecasting accuracy may be 
attenuated when information asymmetry is low.  We conjecture that in an environment 
where a number of analysts compete against each other, firm-specific information regarding 
management’s forecasting ability can be revealed by various types of private information 
obtained by these analysts in the process of competition.  Consequently, the role of past 
earnings history to signal the credibility of management forecasts will be mitigated when 
there is a large number of analysts following the disclosing firm.  Therefore, we predict that 
the effect of strings of earnings growth on market participants’ reactions to management 
earnings forecasts that contain good news is not as pronounced for firms with low 
information asymmetry.  In the discussion that follows, we focus on coefficients related to 
good news, as prior research and our results presented in section 4.1 suggest that these are 
the observations in which credibility concerns arise. 
To test our conjecture, we measure information asymmetry as the number of 
analysts following the firm on the day of the management forecast issuance. We divide 
22 
 
firms into two groups (“High Asymmetry” and “Low Asymmetry”) using the median 
number of analysts as the cut-off.  For these tests, a high level of analyst following 
corresponds to a low level of asymmetry.  Table 5 reports regression results of Model [1a] 
through [2b] by the level of information asymmetry.  Table 5, Panel A reports results using 
STRNit as our measure of past earnings.  With CARit as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient on FDit×STRNit×GOODit is 0.572 (p < 0.01) in the Low Asymmetry case, 
relative to 0.702 (p < 0.01) in the High Asymmetry case.  With AFRit as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on FDit×STRNit×GOODit is 0.005 and insignificant (p > 0.5) in the 
Low Asymmetry case, relative to a significantly positive 0.156 (p < 0.01) in the High 
Asymmetry case.  These results are consistent with our conjecture that the association 
between the credibility of good news forecasts and the pattern of past earnings is larger for 
the High Asymmetry group relative to the Low Asymmetry group.   
Table 5, Panel B reports results using STRN_Dit as our measure of past earnings.  
With CARit as the dependent variable, the coefficient on FDit×STRNit×GOODit is 
insignificant in the Low Asymmetry case (γ = 5.830, p < 0.24), yet significantly positive in 
the High Asymmetry case (γ = 7.580, p < 0.05).  With AFRit as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient on FDit×STRNit×GOODit is again insignificant in the Low Asymmetry case (γ = 
0.090, p > 0.5), yet significantly positive in the High Asymmetry case (γ = 2.154, p < 0.10).  
These results suggest that the association between the credibility of good news forecasts and 
the pattern of past earnings exists for the High Asymmetry group but is attenuated in the 
Low Asymmetry group.  
The pattern for bad news is less clear, although this is not surprising given that prior 
research and the results of section 4.1 suggest that credibility concerns arise primarily in the 
case of forecasts that contain good news.  The negative relation between AFRit and 
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FDit×STRN_Dit×BADit  observed in section 4.1 (in which analysts seem to discount news 
given by firms with a long string of earnings increases) is insignificant in the Low 
Asymmetry case (γ = 0.379, p < 0.47) and remains significantly negative in the High 
Asymmetry case (γ = -0.128, p < 0.05). 
Overall, these results are consistent with our conjecture that the association between 
the credibility of good news forecasts and the pattern of past earnings is more pronounced 
in the “High Asymmetry” group.  We find a weaker association (and in some cases no 
association) between past earnings patterns and the credibility of good news management 
forecasts when a disclosing firm has more intensive analyst coverage.  Overall, these results 
are consistent with the prediction that as investors have access to more information, they do 
not need to use past earnings growth as an indicator of management’s forecasting accuracy. 
4.3. Forecast accuracy and forecast bias 
 Our empirical prediction that the credibility of management earnings forecasts is 
increasing in the string of past earnings growth is predicated on the assumption that 
forecasts made by such firms are more accurate predictors of actual subsequent 
performance.  In order to provide direct evidence on this issue we also examine how 
forecast accuracy varies systematically with the length of the prior string of earnings 
growth.  For this comparison of ex post accuracy, we use the actual realized EPS as 
reported by First Call and calculate management forecast errors (MFEit) as: 
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where:  
 
 AEit  = actual realized EPS for firm i, 
 MFit = management’s EPS forecast for firm i, and 
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 Pi  = share price of the firm on the first day of the fiscal year in which the 
management earnings forecast is made. 
 Table 6, Panel A presents evidence on the ex post accuracy of management 
earnings forecasts conditioned on the length of the preceding string of earnings increases.  
A visual inspection of table 6, panel A suggest that the mean absolute error tends to 
decrease with the length of the preceding string of consecutive earnings increases, 
although this relationship is not monotonic.  The mean absolute forecast error for firms 
without a prior string of earnings increases is 0.0162, while the mean absolute forecast 
error for firms with a prior string of earnings increases is 0.0093.  This difference 
between the mean absolute errors is significant at the 0.05 level.   
 We formally test for a relation between the patterns of past earnings and the ex 
post forecast accuracy by estimating the following pooled cross-sectional regression 
models: 
     
    Model [3a]: MFEit =α0a + α1aSTRNit + α2aHORIZONit + α3aPOINTit + α4aMBit  
                                   + α5aFCFit + α6aROAit + α7aDISTRESSit + it  
 
    Model [3b]: MFEit =α0b + α1bSTRN_Dit + α2bHORIZONit + α3bPOINTit + α4bMBit  
                                   + α5bFCFit + α6bROAit + α7bDISTRESSit + it  
 The regression results in Table 6, Panel B show that the coefficients of STRNit and 
STRN_Dit are significantly negative at the 0.01 level, further confirming the relation 
observed in Table 6, Panel A.  Note that, unlike the tests of ex ante credibility, the effect 
of past earnings news on ex post forecast credibility does not depend on the type of news 
(i.e., good vs. bad news).  Overall, these results are consistent with our assumption that 
the accuracy of management earnings forecasts is increasing in the length of consecutive 
prior earnings increases.  However, these results are also consistent with the competing 
hypothesis that firms which have posted long strings of earnings increases are the ones 
that have the greatest discretion over reported earnings and are therefore the ones best 
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able to manage earnings in order to hit their own management earnings forecast.  Our 
results on forecast accuracy must therefore be interpreted with caution.
14
 
4.4 Credibility and earnings management 
 Our last set of tests examines whether the relation between the past pattern of 
earnings and the credibility of management earnings forecasts varies when using the level 
of net assets to proxy for prior earnings management.  Barton and Simko (2002) use net 
operating assets relative to sales (NOA) as a proxy for past optimistic bias in earnings.  
To test for the effect of prior bias in earnings, we follow Barton and Simko (2002) by 
calculating NOA as shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities, plus total 
debt.  We calculate NOA using annual data and deflate by total sales to obtain a measure 
of overstatement in net asset values.
15
  Barton and Simko (2002) suggest that a high value 
of NOA therefore reflects a firm that has been aggressive in the past about the application 
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  We partition firms into two groups (“High 
Net Operating Assets” and “Low Net Operating Assets”) based on the prior year’s NOA, 
using the median NOA as the cut-off.  Models [1a] through [2b] are then re-estimated for 
each subsample, to test how the role of past earnings patterns in the credibility of 
management earnings forecast varies with the level of net assets. 
Table 7, Panel A presents results for each subsample of NOA using STRNit to 
proxy for past earnings patterns.  As before, we focus on good news forecasts, as prior 
research and our prior results suggest that credibility of management forecasts matters 
primarily when firms issue good news.  Using CARit as the dependent variable we find a 
                                                 
14
 As discussed in section 2, the results regarding market reactions to management earnings forecasts do not 
suffer from this same caveat because it seem unlikely that prices would move in the direction of, and in 
response to, anticipated earnings management. 
15
 As a robustness test, we use an alternative definition of NOA following Penman and Zhang (2002). Our 
inferences are unaffected by replacing Barton and Simko’s (2002) definition of NOA with Penman and 
Zhang’s (2002) definition. 
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larger coefficient on FDit×STRNit×GOODit when NOA is low (β = 1.488, p < 0.01) 
relative to when NOA is high (β = 0.320, p < 0.10).  Using AFRit as the dependent 
variable we find very similar coefficients on FDit×STRNit×GOODit when NOA is low (β 
= 0.157, p < 0.05) relative to when NOA is high (β = 1.56, p < 0.01).  Table 7, Panel B 
presents results for each subsample of NOA using STRN_Dit to proxy for past earnings 
patterns.  Using CARit as the dependent variable we find a larger coefficient on 
FDit×STRN_Dit×GOODit when NOA is low (γ = 15.948, p < 0.01) relative to when NOA 
is high (γ = 2.068, p < 0.01).  Using AFRit as the dependent variable we find a larger 
coefficient on FDit×STRN_Dit×GOODit when NOA is low (γ = 2.085, p < 0.01) relative 
to when NOA is high (γ = 0.778, p < 0.10). 
In general, these results suggest that the effect of past earnings is more 
pronounced for firms with low net operating assets (i.e., the effect is more pronounced 
when firms do not have a track record of aggressively managing earnings).  That is, the 
incremental credibility associated with management forecasts made by firms with a 
history of earnings increases is attenuated when the level of net assets suggests that firms 
have obtained those earnings increases through aggressive financial reporting.  Investors 
may react less to such forecast because earnings obtained through aggressive financial 
reporting are less value relevant.  Analysts may react less to such forecasts because the 
past history of aggressive reporting constrains the flexibility to continue to optimistically 
bias earnings, reducing the probability that firms with high NOA can manage earnings to 
hit their own forecasts. 
V. Conclusions 
 This paper examines the relation between the credibility of management forecasts 
and prior firm performance.  Specifically consecutive years of increasing earnings are 
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chosen to proxy for managements’ ability and incentive to forecast accurately.  Using a 
sample of 8,335 management forecasts of annual earnings, we find that good news 
management earnings forecasts for firms with relatively long strings of increasing earnings 
are more credible than those for firms with relatively short strings.  These results are 
consistent with the primary hypothesis that voluntary management earnings forecasts are 
more believable when they are made by firms with long patterns of increasing earnings.  
Supplemental analysis suggests that this result is driven primarily by firms below the 
sample median of analyst following.  Additional analysis suggests that management 
earnings forecasts from firms with long strings of consecutive earnings increases are also 
more accurate relative to ex post realized earnings.  Finally, the increased credibility 
associated with prior earnings increases is attenuated when the level of net assets suggests a 
history of prior earnings management.
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for management earnings forecasts 
 
Panel A: Number of firms issuing management earnings forecasts 
Number of forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of firms 389 229 149 119 108 107 
Percentage 25% 15% 10% 8% 7% 7% 
 
 
Number of forecasts 7 8 9 10 ≥ 11 Total 
Number of firms 81 64 66 46 210 1568 
Percentage 5% 4% 4% 3% 13% 100% 
 
 
Panel B: Number of management forecasts issued per firm-year 
Year 
 
Total number (%) 
of firms 
Total number (%) 
of forecasts 
 Number % Number % 
1993 3 0.08 4 0.05 
1994 14 0.39 14 0.17 
1995 78 2.15 95 1.14 
1996 125 3.45 148 1.78 
1997 155 4.28 220 2.64 
1998 238 6.57 328 3.94 
1999 279 7.70 453 5.43 
2000 329 9.08 519 6.23 
2001 647 17.86 1,342 16.1 
2002 784 21.64 2,064 24.76 
2003 859 23.71 2,757 33.08 
2004 112 3.09 391 4.69 
Total 3,623 100.00 8,335 100.00 
 
Panel C: Management earnings forecasts per length of string of increasing earnings  
Number of years 
of increasing 
earnings 
Number of 
forecasts 
Type of management 
earnings forecasts news 
Good news Bad news 
0 3,397 1,769 1,628 
1 2,503 1,320 1,183 
2 1,325 675 650 
3 647 357 290 
4 262 136 126 
5 116 67 49 
6 45 24 21 
7 21 11 10 
8 11 4 7 
9 5 2 3 
10 0 0 0 
11 3 1 2 
Total 8,335 4,366 3,969 
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Note: 
Our sample consists of 8,335 quantitative management earnings forecasts of annual earnings made by 1,837 
firms between 1993 and 2004. Only point and range forecasts are included in the sample. We count the number 
of years of increasing annual earnings before management forecasts and define it as the “string” of increasing 
earnings. A short (long) string is defined when the length of the string is less than (greater than or equal to) 5. If a 
management earnings forecast is greater than or equal to the most recent mean analyst forecast prior to the 
management forecast date, we code the management forecast as good news. Otherwise, we code it as bad news. 
If management issues a range forecast, we take the mid point of the range as the manager’s point estimate. Total 
number of firms in Panel B is greater than the number of firms in the sample because of duplicate firm 
observations among different years. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of treatment variables for short and long string firms 
 
Variable 
Short String Firms 
(N=8134) 
Long String Firms 
(N=201) 
 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
CAR -0.005 -0.001 0.075 0.002* 0.002* 0.064 
AFR -0.003 0.000 0.023 0.001** 0.000 0.021 
ABSFERR 0.016 0.003 0.049 0.009** 0.003* 0.018 
GOOD 0.523 1.000 0.499 0.542 1.000 0.499 
FD -0.006 0.000 0.034 -0.005 0.000 0.026 
SIZE 7.442 7.309 1.770 6.990*** 6.773*** 1.236 
HORIZON 5.138 5.333 0.764 5.151 5.142 0.576 
POINT 0.760 1.000 0.427 0.771 1.000 0.421 
MB 2.135 1.571 2.042 1.920 1.429* 1.433 
FCF 0.043 0.044 0.083 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.082 
ROA 0.048 0.050 0.129 0.093*** 0.073*** 0.067 
DISTRESS 1.642 2.000 0.746 1.567* 2.000* 0.810 
Our sample consists of 8,335 quantitative management earnings forecasts of annual earnings made by 1,837 
firms between 1993 and 2004. 
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal returns over two trading days [-1, +1], where day 0 is the date of  
management earnings forecasts, 
AFR = Consensus analyst forecast subsequent to management’s earnings forecast less 
consensus analyst forecast prior to management’s earnings forecast, deflated by prior 
period price, 
ABSFERR = Absolute forecast error of management earnings forecast calculated as the absolute 
value of (management earnings forecast less actual earnings), deflated by beginning of 
year price, 
GOOD = qualitative variable taking the value of one if management’s earnings forecast is greater or 
equal to the mean consensus analyst forecast prior to management’s earnings forecast, and 
zero otherwise, 
BAD = qualitative variable taking the value of one if management’s earnings forecast is less than 
the mean consensus analyst forecast prior to management’s earnings forecast, and zero 
otherwise, 
FD = Management forecast less the prior consensus analyst forecast, deflated by beginning of 
year price, 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of market capitalization (shares multiplied by price per share) of the 
firm on the first day of the fiscal year in which the management earnings forecast is 
made, 
HORIZON = Natural logarithm of number of days between management forecast and fiscal period 
end date, 
POINT = Management forecast precision which is zero (one) if management forecast is range 
(point) forecast, 
MB = Market to book value, 
FCF = Free cash flow computed as (data13-data15-data16-data128)/data6 from Compustat, 
ROA = Return on asset computed as data18/data6, 
DISTRESS = Financial distress measure which is zero if Altman’s Z-score > 2.6, one if 1.1 < Z-score 
≤ 2.6, and two if Z-score ≤ 1.1. 
 
*, **, *** p-value < 10%, p-value < 5%, p-value < 1% for mean and median difference, respectively, for two-
tailed pair-wise tests. 
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Table 3 
Correlations of Study Variables (N=8,335) 
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STRN  0.280 0.017 0.052 -0.054 0.006 0.005 -0.054 -0.017 -0.017 0.083 0.095 0.263 -0.060 
STRN_D 0.558  0.020 0.023 -0.005 0.006 0.014 -0.040 -0.015 0.004 -0.021 0.039 0.093 -0.014 
CAR 0.016 0.015  0.279 -0.027 0.225 0.263 -0.016 0.027 -0.029 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 0.003 
AFR 0.039 0.023 0.170  -0.140 0.605 0.726 0.006 -0.009 -0.061 0.048 0.020 0.011 -0.024 
ABSFERR -0.030 -0.022 -0.081 -0.298  -0.097 -0.076 -0.231 0.340 0.045 -0.242 -0.180 -0.186 -0.048 
GOOD 0.005 0.006 0.233 0.288 -0.079  0.866 0.003 0.017 -0.110 0.036 -0.003 0.003 -0.032 
FD 0.015 0.006 0.151 0.610 -0.205 0.273  0.005 0.046 -0.059 -0.006 -0.026 -0.038 -0.027 
SIZE -0.059 -0.039 -0.014 0.058 -0.105 0.003 0.053  0.031 -0.067 0.303 0.129 0.154 0.340 
HORIZON -0.006 0.003 0.038 0.021 0.140 0.048 0.046 0.020  -0.021 0.018 -0.022 -0.005 -0.024 
POINT -0.011 0.004 -0.022 -0.033 -0.011 -0.110 -0.050 -0.069 -0.011  -0.131 0.004 -0.045 -0.034 
MB 0.026 -0.016 0.009 0.024 -0.046 0.022 0.040 0.255 0.008 -0.105  0.443 0.582 -0.154 
FCF 0.087 0.049 -0.028 0.006 -0.080 -0.004 -0.021 0.173 -0.006 0.023 0.181  0.588 -0.038 
ROA 0.146 0.053 0.006 -0.014 -0.075 -0.012 -0.077 0.143 -0.020 -0.018 0.144 0.546  -0.100 
DISTRESS -0.055 -0.015 -0.002 0.014 -0.022 -0.033 0.008 0.302 -0.023 -0.033 -0.147 -0.019 -0.042  
Note: Pearson correlations are below the diagonal and Spearman correlations are above the diagonal of the correlation matrix. Correlation coefficients in bold are 
significant at the 1 percent level. Variable definitions are given in Table 2.  
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Table 4 
Pooled cross-sectional regression analyses on the credibility of management earnings forecasts
a
 
 
Panel A: Restricted Model 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable 
CARit AFRit CARit AFRit 
STRNit ? 0.000 0.000***   
  (0.05) (2.91)   
STRN_Dit ?   -0.000 0.001 
    (-0.02) (0.35) 
FDit + 0.293*** 0.396*** 0.329*** 0.417*** 
  (9.28) (50.03) (13.78) (69.87) 
FDit×STRNit×GOODit + 0.895*** 0.170***   
  (6.58) (5.00)   
FDit×STRNit×BADit ? 0.017 0.019***   
  (0.73) (3.08)   
FDit×STRN_Dit×GOODit +   7.384*** 2.051*** 
    (2.62) (2.90) 
FDit×STRN_Dit×BADit ?   -0.047 -0.086* 
    (-0.23) (-1.69) 
Intercept ? -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000 
  (-4.08) (-3.64) (-4.02) (-1.58) 
N  8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 
R-squared(%)  2.80 37.5 2.40 37.3 
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Table 4 
Panel B: Full model with control variables 
Variable 
Expe
cted 
Sign 
Dependent Variable 
CARit AFRit CARit AFRit 
STRNit ? -0.000 0.000***   
  (-0.21) (2.92)   
STRN_Dit ?   -0.001 0.000 
    (-0.12) (0.05) 
FDit + 0.453** 0.473*** 0.486** 0.477*** 
  (1.97) (8.62) (2.12) (8.70) 
FDit×STRNit×GOODit + 0.781*** 0.123***   
  (5.63) (3.70)   
FDit×STRNit×BADit ? 0.022 -0.001   
  (0.86) (-0.20)   
FDit×STRN_Dit×GOODit +   7.310*** 1.997*** 
    (2.59) (2.97) 
FDit×STRN_Dit×BADit ?   0.023 -0.155*** 
    (0.11) (-3.15) 
SIZEit ? -0.001** 0.001*** -0.001** 0.001*** 
  (-1.98) (5.16) (-2.38) (4.76) 
FDit×SIZEit − -0.020 0.043*** -0.021 0.043*** 
  (-1.22) (10.69) (-1.27) (10.90) 
HORIZONit ? 0.002** -0.001*** 0.003** -0.001*** 
  (2.09) (-5.04) (2.38) (-4.89) 
FDit×HORIZONit − -0.051* -0.081*** -0.046 -0.081*** 
  (-1.72) (-11.45) (-1.55) (-11.48) 
POINTit ? -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
  (-1.07) (-0.72) (-1.21) (-0.84) 
FDit×POINTit + -0.039 -0.142*** -0.085 -0.149*** 
  (-0.46) (-7.10) (-1.03) (-7.54) 
MBit ? 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 
  (1.65) (0.75) (1.74) (0.86) 
FDit×MBit + 0.169*** 0.109*** 0.180*** 0.109*** 
  (4.73) (12.74) (5.04) (12.73) 
FCFit ? -0.041*** 0.007** -0.045*** 0.007** 
  (-3.40) (2.54) (-3.76) (2.26) 
FDit×FCFit − -0.905** -0.079 -1.066** -0.095 
  (-1.97) (-0.72) (-2.33) (-0.87) 
ROAit ? 0.033*** -0.005** 0.033*** -0.004** 
  (3.62) (-2.45) (3.73) (-1.99) 
FDit×ROAit + 0.116* 0.080*** 0.147** 0.081*** 
  (1.77) (5.09) (2.26) (5.19) 
DISTRESSit ? 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (0.69) (0.65) (0.81) (0.65) 
FDit×DISTRESSit − 0.036 0.051*** 0.045 0.052*** 
  (1.00) (5.88) (1.25) (6.02) 
Intercept  -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (-1.28) (0.81) (-0.12) (0.05) 
N  8,335 8,335 8,335 8,335 
R-squared(%)  3.40 43.3 3.10 43.3 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
and year clustering (Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010). Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 5 
Tests for credibility of management earnings forecasts conditioned on information asymmetry 
 
Panel A:  Regression analyses using STRNit 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable = CARit  Dependent Variable = AFRit  
Low Asymmetry High Asymmetry Low Asymmetry High Asymmetry 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
STRNit ? 0.000 -0.07 0.000 0.29 0.001*** 2.98 0.000* 1.72 
FDit + 4.067*** 3.92 0.955*** 3.34 0.552*** 2.45 0.560*** 7.71 
FDit×STRNit×GOODit + 0.572*** 2.58 0.702*** 3.73 0.005 0.11 0.156*** 3.27 
FDit×STRN_Dit×BADit ? -0.098 -1.34 0.051* 1.69 0.102*** 6.42 -0.014* -1.85 
SIZEit ? -0.001 -1.21 0.000 -0.41 0.000 0.34 0.001* 1.86 
FDit×SIZEit − -0.095 -1.49 -0.079*** -3.73 -0.021 -1.55 0.033*** 6.22 
HORIZONit ? 0.000 -0.35 0.005*** 2.77 -0.001*** -4.10 -0.001*** -2.64 
FDit×HORIZONit − -0.594*** -4.65 -0.058* -1.63 0.006 0.20 -0.087*** -9.65 
POINTit ? -0.002 -0.79 -0.002 -0.61 0.000 -0.08 0.000 -0.46 
FDit×POINTit + 0.124 0.66 -0.120 -1.10 0.061 1.49 -0.164*** -5.92 
MBit ? 0.001* 1.91 0.000 0.34 0.000 -1.14 0.001** 2.34 
FDit×MBit + 0.312*** 3.98 0.132*** 2.94 0.063*** 3.71 0.116*** 10.20 
FCFit ? -0.008 -0.51 -0.074*** -4.08 0.010*** 2.97 0.005 1.19 
FDit×FCFit − -1.852* -1.74 -0.482 -0.84 -1.552*** -6.74 0.181 1.25 
ROAit ? 0.013 1.05 0.050*** 3.88 0.000 -0.04 -0.007** -2.12 
FDit×ROAit + 1.264* 1.81 0.008 0.09 0.902*** 5.96 0.049** 2.39 
DISTRESSit ? 0.004** 2.20 -0.002 -0.91 0.001 1.60 0.000 0.04 
FDit×DISTRESSit − 0.184 1.52 -0.019 -0.44 0.005 0.21 0.047*** 4.32 
Intercept ? -0.002 -0.21 -0.020* -1.74 0.005*** 2.64 0.000 0.04 
N  4585 3750 4585 3750 
R-squared(%)  5.89 3.80 35.60 47.75 
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Table 5 
Panel B:  Regression analyses using STRN_Dit 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable = CARit  Dependent Variable = AFRit  
Low Asymmetry High Asymmetry Low Asymmetry High Asymmetry 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
STRN_Dit ? 0.004 0.44 -0.002 -0.18 0.000 -0.16 0.000 0.08 
FDit + 3.606*** 3.51 0.979*** 3.44 0.732*** 3.30 0.585*** 8.10 
FDit× STRN_Dit ×GOODit + 5.830 1.18 7.580** 2.08 0.090 0.08 2.154* 1.69 
FDit× STRN_Dit ×BADit ? 2.045 0.84 0.180 0.78 0.379 0.72 -0.128** -2.17 
SIZEit ? -0.001 -1.35 -0.001 -0.64 0.000 0.27 0.000 1.42 
FDit×SIZEit − -0.085 -1.33 -0.081*** -3.86 -0.022 -1.61 0.032*** 5.95 
HORIZONit ? 0.000 -0.14 0.005*** 3.02 -0.001*** -4.30 -0.001** -2.41 
FDit×HORIZONit − -0.538*** -4.25 -0.049 -1.39 -0.011 -0.39 -0.088*** -9.76 
POINTit ? -0.002 -0.80 -0.003 -0.75 0.000 0.34 -0.001 -0.72 
FDit×POINTit + 0.031 0.17 -0.154 -1.43 0.099*** 2.49 -0.182*** -6.68 
MBit ? 0.001** 1.94 0.001 0.49 0.000 -1.04 0.001*** 2.56 
FDit×MBit + 0.321*** 4.09 0.148*** 3.29 0.063*** 3.69 0.117*** 10.24 
FCFit ? -0.013 -0.78 -0.077*** -4.28 0.011*** 3.13 0.004 0.96 
FDit×FCFit − -2.240** -2.14 -0.493 -0.87 -1.663*** -7.34 0.125 0.87 
ROAit ? 0.014 1.15 0.052*** 4.01 0.001 0.21 -0.006* -1.74 
FDit×ROAit + 1.100* 1.77 0.024 0.30 1.307*** 9.75 0.052*** 2.58 
DISTRESSit ? 0.004** 2.32 -0.001 -0.81 0.000 1.26 0.000 0.12 
FDit×DISTRESSit − 0.240** 2.01 -0.011 -0.26 -0.013 -0.51 0.047*** 4.26 
Intercept ? -0.002 -0.26 -0.020 -1.69 0.006*** 3.06 0.001 0.40 
N  4585 3750 4585 3750 
R-squared(%)  5.38 3.50 35.24 47.54 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm and year clustering (Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010). Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Tests for ex-post credibility of management earnings forecasts using absolute forecast error 
 
Panel A: Mean absolute forecast error of management earnings forecasts   
STRNit N Mean(absferr) 
0 3397 0.0192 
1 2503 0.0110 
2 1325 0.0186 
3 647 0.0176 
4 262 0.0111 
5 116 0.0106 
6 45 0.0100 
7 21 0.0062 
8 11 0.0031 
9 5 0.0041 
11 3 0.0028 
STRN_Dit =0 8134 0.0162 
STRN_Dit =1 201 0.0093 
Difference  p-value=0.02 
 
 
Panel B: Regression analyses 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable = ABSFERRit 
STRNit STRN_Dit 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
STRNit (or STRN_Dit) − -0.001*** -2.55 -0.007*** -5.09 
SIZEit − -0.003*** -7.97 -0.003*** -7.91 
HORIZONit + 0.009*** 13.69 0.009*** 13.69 
POINTit − -0.002 -1.55 -0.002 -1.52 
MBit − 0.000 -1.25 0.000 -1.33 
FCFit + -0.024** -2.05 -0.024** -2.05 
ROAit − -0.011 -0.69 -0.013 -0.78 
DISTRESSit + 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.52 
Intercept  -0.006 -1.56 -0.007** -1.94 
N  8335 8335 
R-squared(%)  32.89 32.73 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm and year clustering 
(Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010). Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively.  
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Table 7 
Tests for credibility of management earnings forecasts conditioned on net operating assets 
 
Panel A:  Regression analyses using STRNit 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable = CARit  Dependent Variable = AFRit  
Low Net Operating Asset High Net Operating Asset Low Net Operating Asset High Net Operating Asset 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
STRNit ? -0.001 -0.92 0.001 0.83 0.001*** 3.12 0.000* 1.72 
FDit + 0.542 1.53 0.559* 1.73 0.964*** 3.87 0.560*** 7.71 
FDit×STRNit×GOODit + 1.488*** 6.21 0.320* 1.91 0.157** 2.04 0.156*** 3.27 
FDit×STRN_Dit×BADit ? 0.084* 1.73 -0.008 -0.26 0.023 0.79 -0.014* -1.85 
SIZEit ? -0.002** -2.21 0.000 -0.58 0.000*** 2.59 0.001* 1.86 
FDit×SIZEit − -0.108*** -3.50 0.028 1.34 -0.042 -1.46 0.033*** 6.22 
HORIZONit ? 0.004** 2.41 0.001 0.52 -0.001*** -2.88 -0.001*** -2.64 
FDit×HORIZONit − 0.019 0.37 -0.099*** -2.57 -0.068 -1.22 -0.087*** -9.65 
POINTit ? -0.003 -1.12 -0.001 -0.45 0.000 -0.52 0.000 -0.46 
FDit×POINTit + -0.049 -0.34 -0.082 -0.74 -0.281*** -5.40 -0.164*** -5.92 
MBit ? 0.001 1.55 0.001 0.70 0.000 0.62 0.001** 2.34 
FDit×MBit + 0.174*** 3.85 0.126** 1.95 0.097*** 4.68 0.116*** 10.20 
FCFit ? -0.064*** -3.57 -0.017 -1.00 0.006** 2.17 0.005 1.19 
FDit×FCFit − -1.183* -1.74 -0.910 -1.39 0.236 0.66 0.181 1.25 
ROAit ? 0.054*** 4.66 -0.013 -0.80 -0.004 -1.23 -0.007** -2.12 
FDit×ROAit + 0.137 1.48 -0.212 -0.43 0.060 1.15 0.049** 2.39 
DISTRESSit ? 0.002 1.37 0.000 -0.17 0.001* 1.62 0.000 0.04 
FDit×DISTRESSit − 0.086 1.53 0.031 0.44 0.172** 2.45 0.047*** 4.32 
Intercept ? -0.014 -1.32 -0.004 -0.38 0.002 0.62 0.000 0.04 
N  4168 4167 4168 4167 
R-squared(%)  3.74 3.52 47.47 45.45 
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Table 7 
Panel B:  Regression analyses using STRN_Dit 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable = CARit  Dependent Variable = AFRit  
Low Net Operating Asset High Net Operating Asset Low Net Operating Asset High Net Operating Asset 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
STRN_Dit ? -0.008 -1.41 0.010* 1.84 0.001 0.50 0.000 0.16 
FDit + 0.549 1.00 0.549*** 2.53 0.965 3.75*** 0.005 0.03 
FDit× STRN_Dit ×GOODit + 15.948*** 5.65 2.068*** 5.11 2.085 2.80*** 0.778* 1.91 
FDit× STRN_Dit ×BADit ? -0.288* -1.77 1.284 1.61 0.092 0.34 -0.252*** -4.71 
SIZEit ? -0.001* -1.63 -0.002*** -6.11 0.000 2.16** 0.001*** 4.62 
FDit×SIZEit − 0.032 1.00 -0.122*** -4.41 -0.042 -1.43 0.094*** 5.84 
HORIZONit ? 0.001 0.32 0.005*** 3.02 -0.001 -2.88*** -0.001*** -4.29 
FDit×HORIZONit − -0.097* -1.64 0.061* 1.75 -0.072 -1.46 -0.015 -1.16 
POINTit ? -0.001 -0.39 -0.004 -0.84 0.000 -0.33 0.000 -0.58 
FDit×POINTit + -0.120 -0.71 -0.161 -1.32 -0.254 -4.27*** -0.161** -2.40 
MBit ? 0.001 0.50 0.001** 2.41 0.000 0.80 0.000 -0.38 
FDit×MBit + 0.126 0.58 0.189** 2.33 0.103 4.76*** 0.077 1.51 
FCFit ? -0.020 -0.67 -0.068 -1.47 0.006 1.97** 0.005 1.13 
FDit×FCFit − -1.056 -0.94 -1.146 -1.52 0.273 0.77 -0.855*** -2.86 
ROAit ? -0.009 -0.45 0.054*** 2.46 -0.003 -1.11 -0.001 -0.29 
FDit×ROAit + -0.112 -0.18 0.171 1.52 0.058 1.23 1.272*** 7.48 
DISTRESSit ? 0.000 -0.16 0.003 1.01 0.000 1.32 0.000 -0.04 
FDit×DISTRESSit − 0.042 0.26 0.127 1.46 0.171 2.27** -0.027 -0.64 
Intercept ? -0.003 -0.17 -0.013 -1.04 0.004 1.01 0.001 0.63 
N  4168 4167 4168 4167 
R-squared(%)  4.11 3.35 46.86 45.54 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm and year clustering (Peterson 2009; Gow et al. 2010). Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
